Except that Prosper legal agreements at the time specifically did not allow for any such action and specifically stated a different action would occur.
I certainly think Prosper could have done a lot better than it did in its collections, but I actually don't think what it did was worse than if it had sold the loans to a debt buyer. When Prosper was selling notes to debt buyers, it was able to sell only a small percentage of its notes, for a penny or so on the dollar each.
I don't know if you are mistaken or if you are lying, but either way, this is complete bullshit. When Prosper was selling Late-4s to JDBs (as it was obligated to do under the terms of the then-applicable LRA), it sold nearly EVERY such loan (except for ones in BK), and for FAR more than "a penny or so on the dollar each." I actually saved a spreadsheet showing the results of each and every JDB sale Prosper conducted, and data about its aborted Spring 2008 sale (attached to this post). As you can see:
Prosper conducted 4 debt sales -- in 12/06 (51 loans), 5/07 (294 loans), 8/07 (309 loans), and 12/07 (701 loans). That is 1,355 loans sold to JDBs by Prosper. Here were the sale prices:
12/06: Homeowners yielded a whopping 27%-30% of outstanding balance. Non-homeowners yielded 15-18% for credit D and above, and 3-3.7% for E and HR.
5/07: Homeowners yielded 16-19%, while non-homeowners yielded 2.4-3.3%.
8/07: AA and A yielded a whopping 23%. B-D yielded 13.3%, and E&HR yielded 8.1%.
12/07: Homeowners yielded 12.5%. Non-homeowners yielded 9.6% for AA-A, 9.1% for B-D, 7.3% for E&HR, and even NC yielded 4.8%.
As you can see, not a single category in any of the 4 debt sales yielded "a penny or so on the dollar each." And for many of the categories, the sale prices were very substantial. For example, homeowners yielded excellent prices in the three sales where that was a pricing factor (especially the 1st sale, with a yield of 27-30%). And in 3 of the sales, even non-homeowners in all but the lower credit grades did well -- non-homeowner AA-D loans in those 3 sales yielded at least 9.1% (and as high as 18%). The worst return was non-homeowners in the May 2007 sale, which yielded 2.4-3.3%.
Now let's turn to the aborted Spring 2008 sale.
There was $6.6 million of Late-4s that Prosper was obligated to sell to JDBs for us. Prosper admitted that it had been offered at least a third as much as the December 2007 prices. That means lenders with homeowner deadbeats (more than half by dollar volume of the loans at issue were homeowners) would have gotten 4.2% of their money back. And even the non-homeowners would have brought in 3.2% for AA-A, 3.03% for B-D, 2.43% for E-HR, and 1.6% for NC (less than 0.3% of the dollars at issue were NC). Prosper had no legal right to decide for lenders that those prices were too low. A decision that turned out to be terrible for many lenders, myself included (I haven't received a penny in "post-chargeoff collections" from any of my defaults, IIRC).
Moreover, the real reason why Prosper wouldn't go forward with the Spring 2008 debt sale (and very possibly the reason for the low prices), was that the JDB's attached certain "conditions" to their offer, which Prosper unilaterally deemed "unacceptable." Prosper never told us what those allegedly "unacceptable conditions" were, but lenders believed that a likely scenario was that the JDBs insisted on a right to force Prosper to repurchase loans that turned out to have been procured through identity fraud. The reason that condition would have been highly "unacceptable" to Prosper (though manna from heaven for lenders), is that would, of course, have triggered Prosper's so-called "100% identity-theft guarantee," under which Prosper would have had to repurchase all those loans from the lenders at 100% of their principal balance. Since that could have exposed Prosper to millions of dollars of repurchase obligations, one can certainly imagine why Prosper might have decided to never again hold another debt sale -- too much risk of letting expensive skeletons out of the closet.
So if you recovered anything more than a fraction of a percent of charged off notes under the charge-off-and-send-to-collections strategy, you didn't lose anything by Prosper's changing its strategy.
As explained above, completely wrong. And I and many other lenders most certainly were damaged by Prosper's improper "changing its strategy" (otherwise known as breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty).
I also don't see how there's any entitlement to late fees following a charge-off. The law says that when a lender demands payment in full, what's demanded becomes all the lender is permitted to recover and the lender can't come back and demand more. Your contract with Prosper says you can only collect what Prosper recovers, so you have no entitlement to money it can't legally recover from the borrower.
And as also explained by previous posters, Prosper had no legal right to do any of that. It simply made up the whole notion of "charge-offs." Prosper was legally obligated to sell late-4 notes to JDBs for the lenders' benefit. It unilaterally decided not to.
All this, of course, is just a personal opinion, and not legal advice in any way.
Good thing.
