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[Xenon481]

Thanks to Icy for pointing out the new filing.

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000114036112046004/form10q.htm

Q2 2009 - Loss before other income: $2,617,400
Q3 2009 - Loss before other income: $2,289,092
Q4 2009 - Loss before other income: $2,868,908
Q1 2010 - Loss before other income: $2,747,524
Q2 2010 - Loss before other income: $2,787,434
Q3 2010 - Loss before other income: $2,404,217
Q4 2010 - Loss before other income: $2,566,804
Q1 2011 - Loss before other income: $3,097,283
Q2 2011 - Loss before other income: $2,837,560
Q3 2011 - Loss before other income: $2,837,290
Q4 2011 - Loss before other income: $3,519,037
Q1 2012 - Loss before other income: $4,690,488
Q2 2012 - Loss before other income: $3,545,603
Q3 2012 - Loss before other income: $4,448,773

That puts the average burn rate over the past year at ~$4million/quarter or ~1.33million/month.

Prosper currently has (as of 1.5 months ago) Cash and Treasuries totaling ~$8million.

At this average burn rate for the past year, Prosper will need yet another VC cash infusement before the end of Q1 2013. Just 4 months from now.

Prosper spent nearly $0.5million on rebates and promotions in Q3 2012 which was almost the sum total that they spent on that category in Q1 and Q2 combined.

Prosper is spending over $0.8million/quarter on Professional Services which is primarily defending against the class action lawsuit.


Edit: Updated to include all quarterly losses since Prosper started filing with the SEC.

[ira01]

So when will the VC finally tire of throwing good money after bad?  Prosper has made zero progress towards profitability over the past year.  LC is blowing it out of the water on originations, even after spending a ton of money to pump up originations.  I really can't see why anyone would invest more money into Prosper given the numbers, unless it was at fire-sale prices. 

[Xenon481]

Nominating to The Lobby.

[Fred93]

Q2 2009 - Loss before other income: $2,617,400
Q3 2009 - Loss before other income: $2,289,092
Q4 2009 - Loss before other income: $2,868,908
Q1 2010 - Loss before other income: $2,747,524
Q2 2010 - Loss before other income: $2,787,434
Q3 2010 - Loss before other income: $2,404,217
Q4 2010 - Loss before other income: $2,566,804
Q1 2011 - Loss before other income: $3,097,283
Q2 2011 - Loss before other income: $2,837,560
Q3 2011 - Loss before other income: $2,837,290
Q4 2011 - Loss before other income: $3,519,037
Q1 2012 - Loss before other income: $4,690,488
Q2 2012 - Loss before other income: $3,545,603
Q3 2012 - Loss before other income: $4,448,773

Nice trend.  When will they top $5 Million?

[Xenon481]

Restricted Cash
 
Restricted cash consists primarily of cash deposits required to support the Company’s Automated Clearing House and loan origination activities, and secured corporate credit cards.

Does this include (or primarily consist of) the lender deposit accounts? If so, the number is startling: $5,364,159

[Xenon481]

It looks like loans originated in the most recent 3 quarters are going bad at significantly higher rates than previous loans.

[loanuniverse]

Is anybody tracking the number of rounds of VC investment?

Is there any equity left to sell? Or is it more of a case of asking your current investors to pony up more money?

[Xenon481]

Is anybody tracking the number of rounds of VC investment?

Is there any equity left to sell? Or is it more of a case of asking your current investors to pony up more money?

If I am reading the numbers from the 10-Q correctly:

VC's have provided Prosper with $83,066,775 in cash in exchange for various forms and/or releases of stock, but the Total Stockholder Equity is currently listed as $10,455,232.

[yankeefan]

Is anybody tracking the number of rounds of VC investment?

Is there any equity left to sell? Or is it more of a case of asking your current investors to pony up more money?

They just keep issuing additional stock, reducing the ownership share of the current shareholders (dilution).

[Staneslav]

a

[havastat]

It's worth pointing out that revenue has increased sharply and is now roughly a third of expenses. When Lending Club was in a similar position with a similar growth curve a couple of years ago, we praised how well it was doing. At its current growth rate, Prosper won't be able to turn a profit for several years, but if it can raise the cash to make it through, it's still on a track to profitability.

[ira01]

It's worth pointing out that revenue has increased sharply and is now roughly a third of expenses. When Lending Club was in a similar position with a similar growth curve a couple of years ago, we praised how well it was doing. At its current growth rate, Prosper won't be able to turn a profit for several years, but if it can raise the cash to make it through, it's still on a track to profitability.

Its net loss is constantly growing.  That is moving away from profitability, not towards it.

[NewHorizon]

....but if it can raise the cash to make it through, it's still on a track to profitability.

Its net loss is constantly growing.  That is moving away from profitability, not towards it.

No, it's moving toward profitability.  But said "track" keeps growing longer and longer.     
Kinda like chasing rainbows...

[havastat]

I think a difficulty with this line of reasoning is that a very similar revenue and expense pattern appeared with Lending Club as well over the last several years. For most of the time Lending Club has been ramping up, both the total size of the expense pie and the proportionate size of the slice covered by revenue grew, but the loss, the uncovered slice, still kept getting larger and larger in absolute terms. This went on for some time. It was only quite recently that the absolute size of the loss started decreasing. For most of its existence Lending Club's venture capital investors  have had to be prepared to pay for a substantial increase in expenses to ramp up the size of the business before it would become anything anywhere near profitable in absolute terms.

Prosper seems to be following a revenue and expense curve similar to Lending Club, although more slowly and taking longer to reach profitability. The curve looks somewhat like Lending Club's did earlier in its history. 

Because Prosper's income statements are tracking a path similar to Lending Club's over time, I think it's premature to conclude from that track that its long term results will end up worse. If we had made the same predictions from looking at Lending Club's similar track in its earlier phases and reached the same conclusions, we would be proved wrong.

There are certainly externalities, like the lawsuit and perhaps investors pockets and patience, that we don't know about. On this track Prosper's investors may have to put in more money during the loss period and for a longer time to reach a smaller market share and less overall long-term profitability than Lending Club's. But the overall market is growing fast enough that it's quite likely that it will prove big enough for two, and the second fiddle player may not end up doing so badly.

[Ray Kremer]

It occurs to me that the other factor here is the loan market itself, with the economy and jobs situation the way it is and will continue to be, lending money to people whose only recourse is internet loans doesn't seem like as good an idea anymore.